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Only the Envelope: Opening Up Participation, Surveillance, and 
Consent in Performance 
 
Vahri McKenzie 
 
Like many Australians, I was distressed with the passing of the Data Retention Act in 2015, and 
like many Australians, I did nothing actively to object. The Australian Government’s 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Act 2015 requires 
telecommunications companies to retain and secure certain records for a period of two years. 
Then-Prime Minister Tony Abbott memorably defended this new depth of data gathering by 
using the analogue-era metaphor of the personal letter; the material to be gathered is the 
metadata, akin to the material on the front of the envelope, while the contents of the letter 
remain private (“Interview with Michael Brissenden, ABC AM” 2014). We need not worry about 
invasions of privacy, the metaphor implies, because it is only the envelope that is gathered. In the 
Channel Nine interview in which the proposed legislation was first explained, Abbott made an 
error, later clarified, by referring to web-browsing history as metadata when it is in fact content. 
“It is not what you’re doing on the internet, it’s the sites you’re visiting. . . . It’s not the content, 
it’s just where you have been, so to speak” (cited in Griffiths 2014). Abbott’s confusion is 
indicative of the limited understanding the public has about large-scale data gathering, so-called 
big data, with which most of us are now involved, more or less unwittingly. 
 
As an artist and scholar, I did continue to reflect upon the agenda that sees us all included in the 
social contract as long as we comply with the ubiquitous surveillance interventions in our lives, 
regardless of whether we understand their implications. The social contract builds on the 
Enlightenment ideal in which members of a community give up some individual freedoms in 
exchange for the common good—up to a point. It might be argued that digital surveillance and 
big data, as fundamental components of the twenty-first-century social contract, push this point 
in troubling new ways because digital surveillance mechanisms produce conditions that suggest 
transparency while, in fact, actively obscuring full access to information. A sense of collective 
complicity was the main impetus for the research project Only the Envelope: An Artistic Exercise in 
Data Retention, which combines research methodologies to investigate the ways in which we share 
personal information in the public sphere. The performance stage of the project was a work of 
live art (McKenzie 2016) that offered visitors the intimate experience of viewing an original 
video while being monitored by a “scientist”—both performer and research assistant—who 
invited viewers to be involved in an “experiment”: viewing a video while wearing Tobii Pro 
Glasses 2, a wireless eye-tracking device. The performer, as laboratory technician, explicitly 
gathered demographic information and captured data about where the participants looked, who 
they looked at, and how long they looked. These processes are analogous to those typically 
required for website membership forms that gather demographic details and log users’ navigation 
on the site. In addition, the research assistant performed close observation and note-taking 
during the period of participation, enacting a version of the twenty-first-century social contract 
in which participants are offered a free experience if they consent to surveillance. 
 
 
Vahri McKenzie is a senior lecturer in the School of Arts and Humanities at Edith Cowan University in 
Western Australia. Her articles have appeared in PARtake: The Journal of Performance as Research, Journal of 
Dance and Somatic Practice, and Brolga: An Australian Journal about Dance. 
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Publicity image for Vahri McKenzie, Only the Envelope, live art installation shown in the Archive Room, Bunbury 
Regional Art Galleries, Western Australia, March–April 2016. Photograph by Vahri McKenzie. 
 
Taking Only the Envelope (OTE) as the key example, in this paper I will describe and discuss three 
performance works (OTE; McKenzie, Sleep Disorders 2010; McKenzie and Russo, Fool Asleep 
2012) in the context of applied and participatory contemporary performance paradigms. I will 
contextualize my practice that performs a version of neoliberal faith in “science,” which might 
be described as scientism, a belief that empirical science constitutes the most authoritative 
worldview, to the exclusion of other approaches. In OTE this tendency is apparently enhanced 
by powerful technologies: Tobii Pro Glasses 2 and its interpretive software. My recursively 
playful performance troubles a distinction between the apparently private experience of viewing 
art with the apparently public experience of being surveilled by rendering visible the surveillance 
occurring within an artistic space while viewers are engaged in a solo viewing of a video. In this 
live and participatory work I hoped to invite resistance, or reflective decision making on a 
personal level, where participants could try out different ethical positions—be more or less 
compliant—as a way of discovering their own feelings on the matter of data retention in the 
“low stakes” context of viewing art. There was little evidence of resistance among those who 
gave their consent to participate in the work, though a greater freedom of response was observed 
among those who implicitly participated by observing the work or refusing to be involved.  
 
OTE’s participatory element offered a provocation that challenged and potentially informed 
viewers of the work; at the same time, the structured process of gaining consent is not dissimilar 
to online surveillance in its inauthentic presentation of choice that obscures a competitive 
corporate agenda. Kirsty Best’s 2010 study “Living in the Control Society” uses qualitative data 
to investigate public understanding of surveillance in the online world, revealing a scenario 
characterized more by pragmatism than understanding. Democratic citizenship is increasingly 
constrained by authority and discipline, and by power imbalances between corporate and state 
bodies and “data subjects”: 
 
Information is ritually and relentlessly extracted from those who wish to 
participate in almost any form of citizenship or consumption. The market for 
this data is an extremely lucrative one, and although information can be said to 
undergird the participatory, collaborative democracy of Web 2.0, its generation is 
also often private and often obligatory. (Best 2010, 8)  
	 	 McKenzie	  
Performance Matters 3.2 (2017): 57–71 • Only the Envelope	 59 
OTE may serve as a timely reminder that refusing to comply by opting out of digital surveillance 
is extremely difficult to accomplish; raising awareness around the illusion of choice and the facts 
of surveillance is a more realistic goal. Within this complex picture, where power is held in the 
combined forces of structured participation, institutional authority, and technoscience, an artistic 
exercise in data retention can make a valid contribution to understanding participation, 
surveillance, and consent in performance.  
 
Applying Science and Participation: Contexts of OTE 
 
Only the Envelope: An Artistic Exercise in Data Retention was funded by Edith Cowan University 
(ECU) via its eResearch Technology Funding Scheme (ETFS), which funds pilot research 
projects that employ information technologies held by the University. According to the ETFS 
webpage, “The overall aim of this program is to stimulate and facilitate the uptake of eResearch 
technologies by ECU researchers” (“eResearch Technology Funding Scheme (ETFS)” n.d.). This 
aim provokes me to suggest that the Scheme encourages and supports technology-led research, 
which in turn reflects the power accorded technoscience and research that employs sophisticated 
technologies. I was sufficiently provoked to create a work in response, building on previous 
works that took sleep science as a subject; these will be glossed in the next section. OTE adds to 
this body of work and includes a collaborative encounter between participants, performers, and 
technology that takes place in a gallery setting. 
 
 
Rachelle Rechichi as “Svetlana” in Only the Envelope, 2016. Photograph by Vahri McKenzie. 
 
OTE can be described as delegated performance. I hired a research assistant, Rachelle Rechichi, 
to attend the gallery in my stead, playing the role of a laboratory technician and collecting data. 
Rechichi is a writer and musician who received training in the use of Tobii Pro Glasses 2. 
Together we developed a character, Svetlana, who engaged with the viewers of the work. She 
wears a white lab coat and allows participants to see her donning surgical gloves. As a character, 
Svetlana represents a playful personification of institutional control that compromises individual 
liberty as a trade-off for greater collective security. She developed stark contrasts between verbal 
directives that offered information and clear choices, with body language and tone that implied 
invasions of privacy, such as standing to the side of the participant, very close but not touching, 
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and using the participant’s name more often than is customary. The performance deliberately 
plays up the invasive inauthenticity that is suggested by transactional engagements with medical 
professionals and the managerial state. 
 
According to Claire Bishop, delegated performance is “the act of hiring nonprofessionals or 
specialists in other fields to undertake the job of being present and performing at a particular 
time and at a particular place on behalf of the artist, and following his or her instructions” 
(Bishop 2012, 91). Bishop’s paper is situated in the discourse of the so-called “social turn” in 
contemporary art and focuses on the potentially ethically questionable practices of delegation. I 
am more interested in her taxonomy of delegated performance, where OTE falls into the second 
type, the use of professionals from other fields of expertise, which is far less controversial than 
the use of nonprofessionals hired for their representations of particular identities (Bishop 2012, 
95). In keeping with the commodification of culture, Bishop observes that the delegated 
performance tendency coincides with managerial changes in the economy such as outsourcing 
(Bishop 2012, 103-4), such that “Presence today is arguably less a matter of anti-spectacular 
immediacy (as was the case during the 1960s) than evidence of precarious labor, but artists are 
more likely to sustain this economy than to challenge it” (Bishop 2012, 105).  
 
Delegation is consistent with broader social trends that foreground participation; furthermore, 
delegated performance is an apt way of framing big data, which requires delegated performances 
of labour through private individuals inputting personal data online that is surveilled and 
monetized by commercial entities. OTE is fundamentally participatory, but it troubles where 
delegation is happening because Svetlana delegates the labour of data acquisition to the 
participant, while Svetlana is herself a delegate for the artist. Bishop provides some useful 
markers within the social dimension of participation in contemporary art, where there are two 
tendencies: “an authored tradition that seeks to provoke participants, and a de-authored lineage 
that aims to embrace collective creativity; one is disruptive and interventionist, the other 
constructive and ameliorative” (Bishop 2006, 11). OTE can be seen to fit the former category, 
albeit in a playful way, where the delegated aspect of the work undermines any authorial heavy-
handedness. Moreover, Svetlana’s performance on behalf of the artist draws attention to 
scientific norms that distinguish labour from authorship. 
 
OTE can additionally be described as applied performance that, according to Nicola 
Shaughnessy, includes works that are collaborative, participatory and socially engaged 
(Shaughnessy 2012, xiv), where such performances are to be found across a variety of practices 
including devising, performance art, durational, site/place responsive, intermedial and live art 
(Shaughnessy 2012, xv). This range gives a sense of the breadth of contemporary art practices 
that can be viewed as applied performance, such that “the dualisms of the aesthetic and non-
aesthetic” (Shaughnessy 2012, xvi) are increasingly redundant. Other important contributions in 
this area have been provided by Jen Harvie in Fair Play: Art, Performance and Neoliberalism, who 
questions whether the turn to social engagement in art and performance may in fact be 
“complicit with the agendas of neoliberal capitalist culture” (2013, 3), while maintaining critical 
space for participatory works that offer “constructive engagement” through “pleasurable fun” 
(10). Contributors to Performance and Participation: Practices, Audiences, Politics continue to investigate 
the paradox of participation, recognizing that “Participation is politically pliable, and it can no 
longer be taken for granted that its dramaturgical strategies carry specific political meanings or 
social imperatives” (Harpin and Nicholson 2017, 3). 
 
It is not uncommon in this participatory neoliberal context to find science-themed artworks. Art-
science collaborations can be traced to cultural shifts of the 1960s; the best examples illustrate 
both the creativity of scientific research and the rigour of artistic practice (see for example De 
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Oliveira, Oxley, and Petry 2003 on installation). More recently, Shaughnessy (2012) illustrates the 
extent to which cognitive science has infused performance studies, challenging the doxa in both 
fields: 
 
Cognitive neuroscience has reconceptualised our understanding of how we learn, 
the way we think and how we engage with our environment. Perception, 
memory, identity and subjectivity, agency, relations and interactions with others, 
emotions, empathy, embodiment, affect are prevalent themes of both applied 
theatre scholarship and cognitive studies. (2012, xvii) 
 
New findings arising out of these collaborations theorize mind and body, and self and other, as 
“dynamic, iterative and integrated” (Shaughnessy 2012, xviii). But there is also room for concern 
in the artistic adoption of observation, measurement, and data accumulation. In a review essay 
on contemporary approaches to curation, Hal Foster sounds a note of caution, observing that 
while 1960s conceptualism permitted anything to be art, which opened the field to 
interdisciplinary collaborations—“the Gestamtkunstwerk, the library, the archive, the collection, 
the laboratory” (2015, 14)—he questions whether this opening up offers new agency or merely 
heightened administration: “As ‘cognitive labourers’ we manipulate information, which is to say 
we curate the given, and this compiling often presumes a good amount of compliance” (13). 
Perhaps the seeds of this caution were seen by Foster as early as 2004; in a note accompanying 
the influential essay “An Archival Impulse,” Foster speculates that archive art may be bound up 
with “archive reason”; implicated 
 
with a “society of control” in which our past actions are archived . . . so that our present 
activities can be surveilled and our future behaviours predicted. This networked world 
does appear both disconnected and connected—a paradoxical appearance that archival 
art sometimes seems to mimic. (2004, 22) 
 
This “society of control” is a Deleuzean notion whose characteristics are tested by Kirsty Best’s 
study that uses qualitative data to investigate public understanding of digital surveillance, which I 
will explore below. But first, I will turn to the findings of OTE in order to examine the 
operations of participation and consent in this artwork that engages with technoscience at several 
levels.  
 
Participation and Consent: Data and Meaning in OTE 
 
I have long been drawn to a performance practice that engages with technoscience through a 
playful subversion of its norms. Sleep Disorders (McKenzie 2010) enacted invented sleep 
pathologies, using performance art to explore scientific incursions that problematize a “natural” 
state and to interrogate tensions between sleep science and art. I made the work for Lisa Carrie 
Goldberg’s installation Perth Institute of Sleep Behaviour (2010), which recreated a sleep laboratory; 
Goldberg invited me to become a “subject” in her lab and to respond with an original work after 
immersion in her process. The installation created a laboratory space within an artistic space, 
where the authenticity of the installation was supported by Goldberg’s MA in Biological Arts 
with world-leading research centre SymbioticA at the University of Western Australia (UWA), 
which gave her access to UWA’s sleep lab. I spent long periods of time within the installation, 
read medical literature, and viewed authentic surveillance footage; surveillance of sleeping 
subjects is fundamental to sleep science. My performance within the installation was videoed in 
low resolution and posted on the Internet, suggesting a troubling equivalence between 
surveillance footage of sleep science subjects and work that “passes” as such. 
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Publicity image for Vahri McKenzie and Hellen Russo, Fool Asleep, in Fringe World Festival 2012. Perth, Australia: 
The Treasury, 2012. Photograph by Lisa Carrie Goldberg. 
 
Fool Asleep (McKenzie and Russo 2012) was the culminating work of two years’ research in 
performing sleep pathologization, a one-act play that used spoken text, original video and dance 
(choreographed by co-creator Hellen Russo) to present the complex relationship between a 
subject of a sleeping disorder and an examining sleep scientist, within a narrative frame. I wrote 
and performed the original script based on lay and scientific sleep science texts, which reframed 
scientific discourse and so questioned the assumptions that have rapidly created a new medical 
specialty. Surveillance footage featuring Russo and me was acquired to contribute to mise-en-
scène, which was itself part of an original site-specific work that juxtaposed the pervasiveness of 
surveillance technologies with the vulnerability of the state of sleep (McKenzie & Russo 2011). 
The ubiquity of CCTV in public spaces demands a compliance of individuals that reflects the 
relationship between subject and scientist.  
 
Sleep Disorders and Fool Asleep reflect my ongoing interest in the performance of technoscience, 
beginning with the aesthetic choice to recreate laboratories complete with white-coated 
technicians and powerful technologies. Moreover, these works’ interest in “gazes” finds fruitful 
material in scientific scenarios and discourses. The scientific method that employs close 
observation in order to generate a hypothesis is deeply entangled with the power of looking that 
is fundamental to drama. I have included brief descriptions of these works to contextualize my 
response to the provocation of ECU’s eResearch Technology Funding Scheme. Initially, I 
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approached OTE as an explorer, seeking to gather data for a purpose unspecified, to better 
reflect the Australian Government’s Data Retention Act, which gathers metadata 
indiscriminately. But institutional feedback indicated that gathering data for purposes unspecified 
would not meet the requirements of ECU’s Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC), so I 
ensured my application made some clear claims about the “hard data” to come. Namely, when 
viewing a video and wearing eye-tracking glasses, who do the participants focus on? Where do 
they look? How long is their attention span? These data were duly gathered, within the context 
of an arts-based research inquiry in which the use of the eye-tracking technology was 
exploratory; key findings show that participants tend to focus on the eye, nose and mouth areas 
of faces depicted, in accordance with expectations.  
 
However, the insights regarding participant behaviour produced by the eye-tracking technology 
are incomplete for (at least) two reasons. Firstly, the interpretations were made from a small 
sample. The second, and more interesting, reason that this data picture is incomplete is that the 
richest information came from the studio notes made by Svetlana while observing participants 
engaging with the work, which leads to two further points. Uncontroversially, we are reminded 
of the importance of context and qualitative research in understanding data, which undermines a 
model that imagines that technologies can provide accurate or complete pictures and impartial 
data.  
 
The other point is vital for my argument about responses to participation and consent in OTE’s 
performance of science and suggests that the process of gaining consent is associated with a loss 
of power and knowledge. There was nothing deceptive about Svetlana noting her observations: 
“informed consent” was gained via a script that had the approval of ECU’s HREC, where the 
first line stated: “This project, Only the Envelope, contrasts the private experience of viewing art 
with the public experience of being surveilled, to contribute to a public dialogue about data 
retention and sharing private information.” But how well understood was this process? How 
seriously was it taken? Svetlana’s notes suggest that the consent process was taken with the same 
seriousness with which we routinely give our consent to online “agreements.” For example: 
 
English was a problem for my next participant. . . . The verbal consent was read 
and the participant agreed by saying “yes” at the conclusion. Following the 
consent script recording, I asked the participant for his full name. At this point 
he got out his translator, which suggested that the verbal consent script would 
have been mostly not understood. 
 
As Hal Foster reminds us, “Who among us considers what is signed over when we click ‘I 
agree’?” (2015, 13).  
 
For the purposes of ECU’s HREC, “participants” in OTE were defined by wearing eye-tracking 
glasses, but as the project progressed the value of “non-participants” became evident. Although 
consent was collected from sixty-five participants, almost as many can be said to have 
participated without consent, by either declining to participate when approached or participating 
as a companion to the one who gave consent, and observing the whole process, including 
viewing the video, if they chose. As the project unfolded, it became clear that interesting 
observations could be made about these viewers, who, in effect, participated in an unanticipated 
way and expanded my understanding of “participants” and “participation,” so Svetlana began 
gathering notes on a number of these companion-observers. Svetlana’s studio notes distinguish 
between “participants,” those who formally gave consent, and “observers,” who are companions 
to “participants.” It is an ironic and telling fact in a paper about participation, surveillance and 
consent in performance that I cannot report further on these findings in detail, as the 
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requirements of the University’s HREC prohibit it. I cannot quote from Svetlana’s studio notes, 
nor can I state the number of these non-consenting participants. It can be seen here that the 
HREC process provides protections to participants in OTE that are not extended in other 
modes of surveillance and data acquisition, and yet the perfunctory nature of the HREC 
becomes absurd in its consequences when it limits discussion of low-risk activities and de-
identified data. 
 
I can note general tendencies: the key finding is that different behaviours are observed between 
those watching the performance as observer and those taking part in the performance as 
participant, where the least compliance in behaviour is observed among those who did not give 
their consent. For example, reactions to Svetlana from those who declined to participate when 
approached varied widely, from emphatic resistance to playful engagement. Svetlana’s studio 
notes reveal a wide range of responses to the work among companion-observers, some of whom 
exhibited freedom of movement in the installation space that enabled them to observe—and 
disrupt—Svetlana’s surveillance activities. The range of responses among observers suggests 
something of the reflective decision making on personal levels I had anticipated with the staging 
of scientific space in an artistic space.  
 
 
Installation view of Only the Envelope, 2016. Photograph courtesy of Bunbury Regional Art Galleries. 
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In OTE a contrast is evident between the variety of responses observed among those who did 
not formally give their consent and the general compliance of those who did. Two observations 
can be made here. It is remarkable that, of the sixty-five participants who had their viewing 
behaviour recorded, none refused to give consent after indicating interest in participating in the 
“experiment,” although one refused to give her name, and in general, Svetlana was unable to tell 
whether participants gave false information. The second remarkable finding is the length of time 
for which participants who formally consented submitted to surveillance. Forty-four eye-tracking 
recordings, that is, over 70% of total recordings, ran the length of the entire video (ten and a half 
minutes). Watching the whole video was not required, nor was it anticipated; in fact, participants 
were explicitly informed they could watch as much or as little as they wished. Viewers were 
explicitly reminded of their freedoms, yet most chose to stay and appeared to engage deeply, or 
apparently wished to appear to engage deeply. Svetlana reports:  
 
Some participants take the “test” very seriously and focus intently on the screen, 
because that’s what they’ve been asked to do. They ignore Svetlana’s invasive 
observation techniques, becoming more intent at those times. 
 
This may be interpreted as an example of the operation of self-surveillance identified in 
Foucault’s metaphor of the Panopticon. Applying Foucault’s familiar adaptation of Bentham’s 
architectural prison model to OTE, Svetlana stands in for the guard in the central tower; she is 
sometimes visible and sometimes not. The participants, like the prisoners, are always visible to 
her and so internalize the norms of behaviour established by her apparent power over them. 
Foucault shows that the major effect of the Panopticon is “to induce in the inmate a state of 
conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. So to 
arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its 
action” (1991, 201). Analysis of the recordings offers ambiguous support for Svetlana’s 
observation above: on the one hand, it is notable how little people seem to be distracted by 
Svetlana when she appears in the viewers’ line of sight, which may suggest they are studiously 
avoiding looking at her. However, of the two scenes selected for analysis, there are only a few 
points where she appears in front of the participant.  
 
What is it that participants are submitting to when they consent? Is it the power of instructions, 
no matter how silly? Of institutions, that of the art gallery, or the university, whose HREC gives 
its experts’ mark of authority to the consent script? Is it “science” and its manifestation in the 
unfamiliar-looking Tobii Pro Glasses 2? When viewed from the perspective of the companion-
observers, Svetlana’s performance of the process of gaining consent is read as a performance, 
and these participants, for the most part, do not limit their freedom to engage with the work as 
they wish. The different behaviours seen when watching this performance as a companion-
observer or taking part in this performance as a “participant” suggest that being inducted into 
the work leads to a compliance not seen when not formally inducted into the work, despite both 
roles being played out within the same delimited space. 
 
In staging a “laboratory” in an art gallery, OTE fits within the twenty-first-century trend toward 
the dramatization of science described in the context section above (for further examples, see 
Shaughnessy 2013; Kirby 2010; Bleeker 2008). Svetlana’s observations suggest that viewers have 
become accustomed to the interpenetration of science and art. On the one hand, one participant 
critiqued the work for its lack of scientific rigour, discounting the aesthetic dimension: 
 
Svetlana got grilled. A research scientist asked way too many questions and 
offered advice on how to improve the quality of the data capture. . . . The 
scientific image presented confuses people. Many don’t know how to respond, or 
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respond by fitting the scenario into something that they are familiar with, an 
existing schema. 
 
On the other hand, there are those who take their duties as citizen scientists very seriously and 
wish to make a valid contribution: 
 
My last participant, an older woman, appeared to see this project as a scientific 
rather than artistic project, believing, in her innocence, that Svetlana was a real 
scientist. . . . Following her session, the participant was apologetic and concerned 
about the accuracy and usefulness of her data as she “zoned out a bit, so it might 
not be that good.” 
 
This participant exhibits the implicit trust in science and technology as neutral and beneficial and 
beyond social and financial influence that OTE aims to critique. Although my older works Sleep 
Disorders (2010) and Fool Asleep (2012) did not explicitly gather data on audience responses, all 
three works seek to generate a response to the surveillance gaze of technoscience. OTE takes this 
interest further by foregrounding the participatory element but paradoxically finds that this may 
in fact work against resistance, reflective decision making, or even playful engagement. 
Participants are encouraged to actively engage in an entangled science-art context, but it would 
seem that the process of gaining consent positions participants as needing protection, after 
which they assume the position of passive subject of the scientific gaze. 
 
Interpretations from the Control Society Thesis 
 
This paper’s final section employs findings from studies in cultural understandings of digital 
surveillance and big data to illuminate the findings of OTE’s qualitative and interpretative 
insights regarding participation, surveillance, and consent in participatory performance. Useful 
interpretive clues for the participant responses to OTE, that is, compliance on the part of those 
who have given consent to participation and surveillance, can be found in Kirsty Best’s “Living 
in the Control Society: Surveillance, Users and Digital Screen Technologies,” which looks at the 
three theses of Deleuze’s “control society” and compares these theoretical constructions with 
evidence from a qualitative study of digital screen users’ perceptions of the relative harms of 
surveillance. Best (2010) finds that, despite growing academic and political concern with data 
surveillance, users appear unconcerned, accepting greater usability for decreased control. The 
first of the three characteristics of the control society model interrogated in Best’s research is the 
dispersion of surveillance that leads to convoluted and inaccurate circulation of personal 
information. Despite this, most people believe information gathering is transparent and accurate, 
and that only wrong deeds are punished. In Best’s study, this belief persists in spite of a 
significant proportion of respondents acknowledging that they give false information as a way of 
gaining a sense of control (2010, 13). The second claim of the control society thesis is its lack of 
limits; “Surveillance is thus freed from spaces, and found instead at mobile, ever-present sites” 
(14). However, users express belief in place-specific surveillance, such as the workplace, and 
context-specific surveillance, especially pertaining to financial matters; Best notes that fraud is 
often misunderstood as a surveillance concern (16). She concludes, “Apart from these two 
context-specific belief patterns about surveillance, which localised anxiety within a confinable 
space or information domain, respondents were generally nonchalant about surveillance” (16).  
 
The third area investigated reflects a commonality between the control society thesis and users’ 
perceptions, where the control society concept describes surveillance as “participatory,” in that 
“contemporary discipline is in fact self-discipline . . . part of what motivates such participation is 
that information transactions involve a seemingly worthwhile trade-off for consumers and 
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citizens” (Best 2010, 17). The “trade-off” is rationalized as a system of rewards and punishments, 
or as a process over which users have no control; fewer respondents identify a need to balance 
care and control, “most often voiced as a belief that surveillance will result in heightened 
security” (17). Overwhelmingly, the “idea of being able to use the technology is a key idea in 
respondent attitudes” (18, emphasis in original). The study’s findings support other research 
which shows that “personalization and privacy are independent constructs. Users value each of 
these separately, and the former higher than the latter” (20). This is borne out in OTE: while 
some gallery-goers declined to participate in the work, none of those who expressed interest 
subsequently declined to participate, even though they were made aware that they would be 
subject to surveillance as a condition of viewing the work.  
 
Best’s findings run against the control society model, which does not necessarily suggest the 
model is wrong, she argues, but that publics have difficulties conceptualizing the abstractions of 
surveillance: 
 
If the control society thesis is a good representation of contemporary 
surveillance practices and their repercussions for the distribution of resources 
and power, then the fact that people do not internalise such maps, but instead 
understand surveillance in terms of localized spaces, realism and truth, means 
that there is a gap that hasn’t been closed through public initiatives such as fair 
information principles. It seems, in fact, that abstract concepts of the flows of 
power in a complex networked, information dense and globalised society are not 
salient for users. (2010, 21) 
 
Furthermore, Best’s study suggests a degree of wilful ignorance regarding users’ awareness of 
surveillance, and when inconsistencies are pointed out, respondents immediately refer to the 
trade-off. “Their attitude toward surveillance thus becomes a pragmatic one, where if 
participation in surveillance is a precondition to participation with technology, then as the latter 
is either desired or mandatory, it only makes sense to comply” (Best 2010, 20). However, Best 
forms a final conclusion, in the form of a question, suggesting that the complexities and lack of 
public understanding of digital screen users’ perceptions of surveillance cast doubt upon the 
existence of consent: “If the majority of users are faced with a trade-off that can be described as 
expedient at best and as inevitable at worst, can consent truly be said to exist?” (21). Best’s study 
offers support for my observations in OTE that, despite my intentions to invite resistance to the 
conditions of the “experiment,” participants who consented to involvement were largely 
compliant.  
 
A distinction is revealed at the heart of my artistic exercise in data retention, in which consenting 
to the work leads to a compliance not seen when the issue of consent is not addressed. OTE, 
however, was clearly delimited by the space of the Archive Room in which it was installed, while 
it is difficult to be beyond the reach of digital screen technologies if one wishes to participate in 
society. The very ubiquity of surveillance in our lives demands individual compliance such that 
the choice to consent or not to consent, to participate or not to participate, is always already 
marked by systems of power and control. Under such circumstances, it is tempting to claim that 
consent disempowers, and that informed consent is a kind of ignorance; even that consent does 
not exist. While participation in the research was defined, for the purposes of ECU’s HREC, by 
the wearing of eye-tracking glasses, looking back at this distinction through the research project 
OTE shows its limits and, potentially, its dangers. The distinction is analogous to different kinds 
of digital screen users, where some are content to “create an account” in order to access online 
content, and some are not. We might consider the many businesses and community groups who 
use Facebook as their public face; to access their content, visitors must “sign up” or “log in.” 
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Like the companion-observers, those who do not use Facebook choose to do without, or find 
alternative routes to information, rather than comply with the limited options made available. 
However, as Wendy Chun has shown, the very act of going online creates digital traces that can 
be followed by others with ever-increasing sophistication; software is inextricably interconnected 
with “transformations in modes of ‘governing’ that make governing both more personal and 
impersonal, that enable both empowerment and surveillance, and indeed make it difficult to 
distinguish between the two” (Chun 2011, 58). 
 
It is a complex picture, made more so when digital on-screen surveillance is conceptualized as 
“big data,” the term “used to describe the massive and continually generated digital datasets that 
are produced via interactions with online technologies” (Michael and Lupton 2016, 104), such as 
those the Australian Government’s Data Retention Act requires telecommunications companies 
to retain. Big data is “involuted,” write Michael and Lupton, in that publics are “both the 
subjects and objects of knowledge, both authors and texts, simultaneously informants, 
information and informed” (2016, 105). Moreover, such involution necessarily muddies the 
waters of knowledge such that critical data studies challenge the supposed neutrality and 
objectivity of big data. The instabilities compound: Michael and Lupton note that “public” is a 
shifting concept with various meanings and constituents (109), but the fact remains that data 
subjects are excluded from any benefits extracted from the collection and commodification of 
their data and have very few ownership rights to it. With data constantly in flux, knowledge is 
unstable, and this “raises issues around the relations of knowledge to ‘ownership’ (which may 
often take opaque forms)” (109); thus, privacy and ownership, too, are unstable. In an 
interpretation that might make sense of the inconsistencies of belief attested to in Best’s study, 
Michael and Lupton 
 
imagine a sort of “oscillatory awareness” of big data as aspects of its 
prosumption come into and out of focus, individually and collectively. Thus, 
issues about privacy, ownership and data exploitation can shift between, or co-
exist as—matters of overt concern and matters of routinized utility. (2016, 111)1 
  
It may well be that the “low stakes” context of viewing art, which I anticipated might playfully 
encourage consideration of data retention among viewers of OTE, was in fact discounted as a 
context of concern and so worked against consideration of data retention. Michael and Lupton’s 
proposed framework for empirical research in public understandings of big data requires 
conceptual shifts that might respond to Best’s identification of the difficulties users have in 
conceptualizing the abstractions of surveillance, such that notions like “affect” and 
“imagination” are important to research design (Michael and Lupton 2016, 112). Furthermore, 
Michael and Lupton suggest that the research methodology will be performative, shaping the 
sort of social data that are produced, and recursive, where a study can become part of its own 
object of study, such that “the empirical task also becomes one of creatively enabling lay people’s 
imaginative and affective relations to big data to unfold” (113, emphasis in original). On the other 
hand, then, it may be that OTE did encourage consideration of data retention; participation was 
anonymous, and no follow-up was done to measure impacts after the event.  
 
It is important that cultural critiques encourage reflective decision making on personal and policy 
levels when it comes to our involvement with various surveillance interventions that encourage 
us to share personal information without fully understanding their implications. OTE reflects 
participatory contexts in contemporary art, showing that “participants” tend not to be concerned 
with data surveillance and generally consent to donating their personal data. While the work 
generated hard data that offers information about where we look, who we look at and how long 
we look at a particular work of art, the live art installation staged encounters that dramatize the 
	 	 McKenzie	  
Performance Matters 3.2 (2017): 57–71 • Only the Envelope	 69 
act of looking and being looked at, generating empirical evidence that offers another way of 
investigating the act of sharing personal data. The qualitative data generated by OTE show that 
those who formally consented to participation through ECU’s Human Research Ethics 
Committee process display higher levels of compliance than those who “participated” by 
refusing to be involved or by participating as a companion-observer, where these viewers of the 
work display a much greater range of behaviours in response to the work. At the same time, 
while these non-consenting participants displayed a greater freedom of response because they 
were not wearing the glasses, they were nevertheless compliant objects of the institutional gaze.  
 
OTE deliberately deploys tropes that suggest an oppressive presence of “science,” “state,” and 
“managerialism,” raising questions about what it is that participants are submitting to when they 
consent: the power of instructions, institutions, technoscience? Literature addressing cultural 
understandings of digital surveillance and big data shed light on OTE’s qualitative and 
interpretative insights regarding participation, surveillance, and consent in participatory 
performance. In particular, the Deleuzian notion of a “control society” that posits twenty-first-
century surveillance as opaque and dispersed is not reflected in public understandings and 
engagement with digital technologies.  
 
Furthermore, “participatory” surveillance encourages self-surveillance and pragmatic decision 
making where compliance is rewarded with access; in OTE the reward was viewing the video, a 
work in its own right.2 These factors come together in OTE such that I might suggest an answer 
to the question posed above: when participants consent to being involved in the work they are 
submitting to the combined powers of instructions, institutions, and technoscience represented in 
the HREC’s contractual consent relationship that purports to both inform and empower, yet 
does neither. Rather, it is evidence of the managerialism with which we are so familiar that it is 
treated as merely a minor obstacle to overcome rather than a process of consequence. It must be 
acknowledged that the HREC offers modest protection to participants in a scholarly artistic 
context, while state and commercial enterprises offer no such protection; the state’s lack of 
privacy protection is supposed to protect us from a larger threat, while commercial entities are 
permitted to exploit private individuals. However, the HREC transacts its “protection” via a 
managerial veneer covering a corporate agenda. In Only the Envelope, the Human Research Ethics 
Committee stands in for various supposedly neutral and objective state apparatuses that quantify 
and commodify, substituting for the complex processes of negotiating and understanding quality 
and value. 
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Notes 
 
1. To the figure of the “prosumer” Michael and Lupton add “produsage,” a neologism reflecting data 
assemblages that “both draw on individuals’ personal data and contribute to large digital datasets and, in 
turn, may be used to feedback to individuals” (2016, 107). Similarly, “prosumption” implies the 
intermixing of producing and consuming content. 
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2. McKenzie, Ben-Ary, Lehrer, and McKee, 2014. Involution and recursion characterize this digital video 
work, which is extended in OTE and explored in McKenzie 2017. 
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